

Presented to the Court by the foreman of the Grand Jury in open Court, in the presence of the Grand Jury and FILED in the U.S. DISTRICT COURT at Seattle, Washington.

November 15 20 17
By WILLIAM M. MCCOOL, Clerk
[Signature] Deputy

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
MUHAMMAD FAHD,
Defendant.

NO. **CR17-290 RSL**
INDICTMENT

The Grand Jury charges that:

COUNT 1

(Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud)

I. INTRODUCTION

At all times material to this Indictment:

A. AT&T Mobility LLC

1. AT&T Mobility LLC (hereinafter, AT&T), was a company with headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia, and offices throughout the United States, including a customer service call center in Bothell, Washington.

2. AT&T sold cellular telephones and offered monthly voice and data plans for use with the phones on the AT&T wireless network. AT&T phones and wireless services were sold through authorized AT&T dealers and retailers across the country.

1 3. AT&T offered subsidies to its customers by selling phones for less than the
2 cost of the phones. AT&T recouped this subsidy investment through profits earned on
3 the sale of AT&T wireless services by entering into service contracts with its customers.

4 4. Manufacturers that produced cellular telephones for AT&T installed
5 proprietary locking software onto AT&T phones that prevented the phones from being
6 used on any wireless network other than the AT&T network unless and until the phones
7 were "unlocked."

8 5. "Unlocking" a phone disabled the proprietary locking software which
9 allowed the phone to be used on multiple carrier systems rather than exclusively with
10 AT&T.

11 6. The Wireless Customer Agreement between AT&T and each of its
12 customers authorized AT&T to effectuate the unlocking of a customer's phone upon the
13 satisfaction of certain criteria, such as when the customer had completed his or her
14 contract or installment plan or paid off an installment plan early. Other circumstances in
15 which AT&T might unlock a phone for a customer included when the customer wished to
16 use the phone for international travel.

17 7. Unlocked phones were a valuable commodity because they could be resold
18 and used on any other compatible networks around the world. When telephone
19 customers switched to networks other than AT&T's network, the customers stopped
20 paying AT&T for services, including, in some cases, before AT&T had recouped the
21 costs of subsidies provided by AT&T on phones it had sold to the customers for less than
22 the cost of the phones.

23 8. When a phone is unlocked fraudulently without AT&T's authorization, the
24 fraudulent transaction deprives AT&T of its subsidy investment in the phone and the
25 stream of payments on contracts that customers may no longer remit because they have
26 switched service to another carrier.

27 9. AT&T employees at AT&T's Mobility Customer Care call center in
28 Bothell, Washington, had access to AT&T's computer systems in order to assist AT&T

1 customers with service and billing issues. Among other things, AT&T employees at the
2 call center had the ability to submit unlock requests on behalf of eligible customers.

3 10. AT&T employees used a variety of internal computer programs at AT&T
4 to process unlock requests including, at times, a system called "Fat Albert," and a system
5 called "Torch." Access to the systems was limited to authenticated users connected to
6 AT&T's internal and protected corporate network.

7 11. AT&T's unlocking systems permitted AT&T employees with proper
8 authorization and network credentials to, in appropriate circumstances, send requests to
9 unlock the phones of AT&T customers.

10 **B. Defendant**

11 12. Defendant MUHAMMAD FAHD, was an individual living in Karachi,
12 Pakistan, doing business as Endless Trading FZE, Endless Connections, Inc., and
13 iDevelopment Co.

14 **C. Definitions.**

15 13. **Malware:** Malware was malicious computer code running on a computer
16 that was not authorized by the owner/authorized user of that computer. Malware could
17 be designed to do a variety of things, including logging every keystroke on a computer,
18 stealing information or "user credentials" (passwords or usernames), and executing
19 unauthorized commands on a computer without the consent of the authorized user.

20 **II. THE OFFENSE**

21 14. Beginning at a date uncertain, but no later than April 2012, and continuing
22 through in or around September 2017, at Bothell, within the Western District of
23 Washington, and elsewhere, defendant MUHAMMAD FAHD, aka Frank Zhang, and
24 others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, did knowingly and intentionally, agree and
25 conspire to devise and execute and attempt to execute, a scheme and artifice to defraud,
26 and for obtaining money and property by means of materially false and fraudulent
27 pretenses, representations, and promises; and in executing and attempting to execute this
28 scheme and artifice, to knowingly cause to be transmitted in interstate and foreign

1 commerce, by means of wire communication, certain signs, signals and sounds as further
2 described below, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343.

3 **III. THE OBJECT OF THE CONSPIRACY**

4 15. The object of the conspiracy was to gain access to AT&T's protected
5 internal computers without authorization, and in excess of authorization, by bribing
6 AT&T employees to submit fraudulent and unauthorized cellphone unlocking requests
7 through AT&T's internal protected computer network through, among other means, the
8 installation of malware and unauthorized hardware on AT&T's internal network. The
9 object further was to sell to members of the public the resulting ability to fraudulently
10 unlock phones, so that the members of the public could stop using AT&T wireless
11 services and deprive AT&T of its subsidy investment in customer cell phones and the
12 value of the wireless service contracts it sold to members of the public.

13 **IV. MANNER AND MEANS OF THE CONSPIRACY**

14 **A. Overview of the Conspiracy**

15 16. It was part of the conspiracy that MUHAMMAD FAHD, and others known
16 and unknown to the Grand Jury, gained unauthorized access to AT&T's internal
17 protected computers through a variety of methods including by bribing AT&T employees
18 (hereinafter "insiders") at AT&T's call center in Bothell, Washington, to use their
19 network credentials and exceed their authorized access to AT&T's computers to submit
20 large volumes of fraudulent and unauthorized unlock requests on behalf of the conspiracy
21 and to install malware and unauthorized hardware on the AT&T systems.

22 17. From in or around April 2012, through in or around April 2013,
23 MUHAMMAD FAHD, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, transmitted
24 instructions to the insiders via the wires in interstate and foreign commerce, including
25 lists of cellular telephone international mobile equipment identity (IMEI) numbers for the
26 insiders to submit for fraudulent and unauthorized unlocking.

27 18. From in or around April 2013, through in or around October 2013,
28 MUHAMMAD FAHD, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, also bribed

1 insiders to plant malware on AT&T's internal protected computers for the purpose of
2 gathering confidential and proprietary information on how AT&T's computer network
3 and software applications functioned.

4 19. Using information gathered by this malware about AT&T's computer
5 network and software applications, MUHAMMAD FAHD, and others known and
6 unknown to the Grand Jury, created additional malware designed to interact with
7 AT&T's internal protected computers and automatically process fraudulent and
8 unauthorized unlock requests submitted over the wires in interstate commerce from
9 remote servers controlled by members of the conspiracy.

10 20. The malware MUHAMMAD FAHD, and others known and unknown to
11 the Grand Jury, planted on AT&T's internal protected computers used network
12 credentials that belonged to actual AT&T employees, including co-conspirators and
13 others, to allow defendant, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to log into
14 AT&T's internal protected computers under false pretenses and automatically process
15 fraudulent and unauthorized unlock requests.

16 21. From in or around November 2014, through in or around September 2017,
17 MUHAMMAD FAHD, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, also bribed
18 insiders to use their access to AT&T's physical work space to install unauthorized
19 computer hardware devices including wireless access points designed to provide the
20 conspiracy with unauthorized access to AT&T's internal protected computers and
21 facilitate the automated process of submitting fraudulent and unauthorized unlock
22 requests on behalf of the conspiracy.

23 22. The unauthorized computer hardware devices, like the malware, used
24 network credentials that belonged to actual AT&T employees, including co-conspirators
25 and others, to allow MUHAMMAD FAHD and others known and unknown to the Grand
26 Jury to log into AT&T's internal protected computers under false pretenses and
27 automatically process fraudulent and unauthorized unlock requests.
28

1 **B. Defendant Muhammad Fahd's Participation in the Conspiracy**

2 23. It was part of the conspiracy that defendant MUHAMMAD FAHD, doing
3 business as Endless Trading FZE (aka Endless Trading FZC), Endless Connections Inc.,
4 and iDevelopment Co. recruited insiders at AT&T who were willing to take bribes to
5 work on behalf of the conspiracy.

6 24. MUHAMMAD FAHD contacted the insiders at AT&T via telephone,
7 Facebook and other communication channels in interstate and foreign commerce and
8 offered to pay them to unlock cell phones. MUHAMMAD FAHD instructed the insiders
9 to obtain pre-paid cellular phones and anonymous online email accounts to continue
10 communicating with him.

11 25. MUHAMMAD FAHD also instructed the insiders to create shell
12 companies and open business banking accounts in order to receive payments for their
13 work on behalf of the conspiracy.

14 26. MUHAMMAD FAHD obtained lists of IMEI numbers for cellular
15 telephones from co-conspirators who offered unlocking services to customers for a fee.

16 27. Beginning in or around August 2012, MUHAMMAD FAHD sent lists of
17 IMEI numbers for cellular telephones via the wires in interstate and foreign commerce to
18 the insiders with instructions to submit unauthorized unlock requests for the IMEIs using
19 their access to AT&T's protected internal computer network.

20 28. In or around April 2013, MUHAMMAD FAHD sent malware to the
21 insiders via the wires in interstate and foreign commerce and instructed them to install the
22 malware on AT&T's computer network. The malware was designed to gather
23 confidential and proprietary information regarding the structure and functioning of
24 AT&T's internal protected computers and applications.

25 29. Using information collected by the malware, MUHAMMAD FAHD, and
26 others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, created additional malware (the
27 "unlocking malware") designed to facilitate the transmission of commands via the wires
28

1 in interstate and foreign commerce from a remote server to AT&T's protected internal
2 computer network and automatically submit unauthorized unlock requests.

3 30. MUHAMMAD FAHD sent the insiders multiple versions of the unlocking
4 malware for purposes of testing and perfecting the malware on behalf of the conspiracy.
5 Once the malware was perfected, MUHAMMAD FAHD instructed the insiders to plant
6 the unlocking malware on AT&T's internal protected computers and run the unlocking
7 malware while they were at work. The unlocking malware used valid AT&T network
8 credentials that belonged to co-conspirators and others, without authorization, to interact
9 with AT&T's internal protected computer network and process automated unauthorized
10 unlock requests submitted from an external server.

11 31. In or around October 2013, AT&T discovered the unlocking malware and
12 fired several insiders who were operating the unlocking malware at MUHAMMAD
13 FAHD's direction.

14 32. In or around November 2014, MUHAMMAD FAHD recruited new
15 insiders at AT&T willing to accept bribes to work on behalf of the conspiracy.

16 33. MUHAMMAD FAHD and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury,
17 began programming hardware devices designed to facilitate unauthorized access to
18 AT&T's internal protected network for the purpose of processing automated
19 unauthorized unlock requests.

20 34. MUHAMMAD FAHD provided the hardware devices to co-conspirators
21 including current and former AT&T insiders who tested the devices. Upon perfecting the
22 operation of the devices, MUHAMMAD FAHD provided the devices to insiders who
23 plugged the devices into AT&T's internal protected network without authorization to
24 facilitate the unlocking of phones in furtherance of the conspiracy.

25 35. MUHAMMAD FAHD continued to pay insiders at AT&T to gain and
26 maintain unauthorized access to AT&T's internal protected computer network, and
27 exceed their authorized access to AT&T's protected internal computer network, plant
28 malware, install unauthorized hardware, and operate malware and unauthorized hardware

1 on AT&T's protected internal computer network on behalf of the conspiracy through in
2 or about September 2017.

3 All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1349.

4 **COUNT 2**

5 **(Conspiracy to Commit Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and Travel Act Violations)**

6 **I. THE OFFENSE**

7 36. The allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 35 of Count 1 of this
8 Indictment are re-alleged and incorporated as if fully set forth herein.

9 37. Beginning at a date uncertain, but no later than April 2012, and continuing
10 through in or around September 2017, at Bothell, within the Western District of
11 Washington, and elsewhere, defendant MUHAMMAD FAHD, aka Frank Zhang, and
12 others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, did knowingly and intentionally agree and
13 conspire to:

14 a. use a facility in interstate and foreign commerce, namely the wires,
15 with the intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on and facilitate the promotion,
16 management, establishment and carrying on of an unlawful activity, that is, Commercial
17 Bribery in violation of the Revised Code of Washington Section 9A.68.060, and
18 thereafter performed and attempted to perform an act to distribute the proceeds of such
19 unlawful activity, and to promote, manage, establish and carry on, and to facilitate the
20 promotion, management, establishment and carrying on of such unlawful activity in
21 violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1952(a)(1) and (3)

22 b. knowingly and with intent to defraud, access a protected computer
23 without authorization and exceed authorized access to a protected computer, and by
24 means of such conduct further the intended fraud and obtain anything of value exceeding
25 \$5,000.00 in any 1-year period, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections
26 1030(a)(4) and (c)(3)(A); and

27 c. knowingly cause the transmission of a program, information, code,
28 and command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally cause damage without

1 authorization to a protected computer, and the offense caused loss to 1 or more persons
2 during any 1-year period aggregating at least \$5,000 in value and damage affecting 10 or
3 more protected computers during a 1-year period, in violation of Title 18, United States
4 Code, Sections 1030(a)(5)(A) and (c)(4)(B)(i).

5 **II. THE OBJECT OF THE CONSPIRACY**

6 38. The object of the conspiracy is set forth in Paragraph 15 of Count 1 of this
7 Indictment and is re-alleged and incorporated as if fully set forth herein. Through this
8 conduct, the conspiracy caused damages to AT&T's protected computers, including
9 impairment to the integrity and availability of data, programs, systems, and information
10 and caused losses to AT&T for the costs of responding to the offense, conducting damage
11 assessments, restoring data, programs, systems and information and lost revenue during
12 any 1-year period in excess of \$5,000.00.

13 **III. THE MANNER AND MEANS OF THE CONSPIRACY**

14 39. The manner and means of the conspiracy are set forth in Paragraphs 16
15 through 35 of Count 1 of this Indictment and are re-alleged and incorporated as if fully
16 set forth herein.

17 **IV. Overt Acts**

18 40. In furtherance of the conspiracy, and to achieve the objects thereof,
19 defendant MUHAMMAD FAHD, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, did
20 commit and cause to be committed, the following overt acts, within the Western District
21 of Washington and elsewhere:

22 a. On or about April 9, 2012, Defendant MUHAMMAD FAHD opened
23 a Google account with the email address unlockoutlet@gmail.com;

24 b. On or about April 13, 2012, co-conspirator 1 (CC-1) created account
25 number 236199 with Softlayer, a cloud server hosting facility;

26 c. On or about August 1, 2012, MUHAMMAD FAHD opened a
27 Facebook account in the name of "Frank Zhang";
28

1 d. In or around August 2012, MUHAMMAD FAHD recruited CC-2,
2 an employee at AT&T in Bothell, Washington, to work in furtherance of the conspiracy
3 using the wires in interstate and foreign commerce;

4 e. On or about August 2, 2012, CC-2 opened a Google account with
5 the email address tyronejeromeskee@gmail.com;

6 f. On or about August 3, 2012, CC-1 sent a text message with the
7 checking account number for CC-2 using the wires in interstate and foreign commerce;

8 g. On or about August 8, 2012, CC-1 wired a bribe payment in the
9 amount of \$4,000.00 to CC-2 from California to Marysville, Washington;

10 h. On or about August 30, 2012, CC-1 wired a bribe payment in the
11 amount of \$11,000.00 to CC-2 from California to Marysville, Washington;

12 i. On or about September 5, 2012, CC-2 sent an email from Bothell, in
13 King County, Washington, to MUHAMMAD FAHD in Karachi, Pakistan, with the
14 subject line "invoice number one" billing for "IT Services, client consulting, system
15 architecture and infrastructure" and other computer related services;

16 j. In or around September 2012, CC-2 recruited CC-3, an employee at
17 AT&T in Bothell, Washington on behalf of MUHAMMAD FAHD to work in
18 furtherance of the conspiracy;

19 k. On or about September 20, 2012, CC-1 wired a bribe payment in the
20 amount of \$12,000.00 to CC-2 from California to Marysville, Washington;

21 l. On or about September 22, 2012, CC-3 opened a Google account
22 with the email address yanghov687@gmail.com;

23 m. On or about October 11, 2012, CC-1 wired a bribe payment in the
24 amount of \$12,000.00 to CC-2 from California to Marysville, Washington;

25 n. On or about October 17, 2012, CC-3 provided MUHAMMAD
26 FAHD with CC-3's bank account number and company name using the wires in
27 interstate and foreign commerce;
28

1 o. On or about October 20, 2012, MUHAMMAD FAHD instructed
2 CC-1 to send money to CC-2 and CC-3 using the wires in interstate and foreign
3 commerce;
4 p. On or about October 29, 2012, CC-1 wired a bribe payment in the
5 amount of \$10,000.00 to CC-3 from California to Des Moines, Washington;
6 q. On or about January 12, 2013, MUHAMMAD FAHD traveled to
7 Dubai, United Arab Emirates from Karachi, Pakistan;
8 r. On or about January 19, 2013, CC-1 traveled to Dubai, United Arab
9 Emirates from Los Angeles, California;
10 s. On or about January 22, 2013, MUHAMMAD FAHD met with CC-
11 1 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates;
12 t. On or about April 11, 2013, MUHAMMAD FAHD opened a Yahoo
13 account with the email address unlockoutlet@ymail.com;
14 u. On or about April 12, 2013, CC-3 opened a Yahoo account with the
15 email address yanghov687@ymail.com;
16 v. In or around April 2013, MUHAMMAD FAHD provided CC-2 and
17 CC-3, employees at AT&T in Bothell, Washington, with malware;
18 w. On or about April 11, 2013, CC-3 installed malware on AT&T's
19 internal protected network;
20 x. On or about April 15, 2013, CC-1 wired a bribe payment in the
21 amount of \$11,000.00 to CC-2 from California to Marysville, Washington;
22 y. On or about April 15, 2013, CC-1 wired a bribe payment in the
23 amount of \$11,000.00 to CC-3 from California to Des Moines, Washington;
24 z. On or about April 20, 2013, CC-2 installed malware on AT&T's
25 internal protected network;
26 aa. On or about April 30, 2013, CC-1 created account number 271319
27 with Softlayer, a cloud server hosting facility;
28

1 bb. On or about May 13, 2013, CC-1 wired a bribe payment in the
2 amount of \$9,500.00 to CC-2 from California to Marysville, Washington;
3 cc. On or about May 15, 2013, CC-1 wired a bribe payment in the
4 amount of \$9,500.00 to CC-3 from California to Des Moines, Washington;
5 dd. On or about June 3, 2013, CC-1 wired \$25,000.00 to MUHAMMAD
6 FAHD in Karachi, Pakistan;
7 ee. On or about June 13, 2013, CC-1 wired a bribe payment in the
8 amount of \$8,500.00 to CC-2 from California to Marysville, Washington;
9 ff. On or about June 13, 2013, CC-1 wired a bribe payment in the
10 amount of \$8,500.00 to CC-3 from California to Des Moines, Washington;
11 gg. On or about July 31, 2013, CC-1 wired a bribe payment in the
12 amount of \$8,000.00 to CC-2 from California to Marysville, Washington;
13 hh. On or about July 31, 2013, CC-1 wired a bribe payment in the
14 amount of \$8,000.00 to CC-3 from California to Des Moines, Washington;
15 ii. In or around August 2013, CC-2 recruited CC-4, an employee at
16 AT&T in Bothell, Washington, on behalf of MUHAMMAD FAHD to work in
17 furtherance of the conspiracy;
18 jj. On or about August 23, 2013, CC-1 wired a bribe payment in the
19 amount of \$7,500.00 to CC-2 from California to Marysville, Washington;
20 kk. On or about August 23, 2013, CC-1 wired a bribe payment in the
21 amount of \$6,200.00 to CC-3 from California to Des Moines, Washington;
22 ll. In or around September 2013, CC-3 recruited CC-5, an employee at
23 AT&T in Bothell, Washington, on behalf of MUHAMMAD FAHD to work in
24 furtherance of the conspiracy;
25 mm. On or about September 23, 2013, CC-1 wired a bribe payment in the
26 amount of \$8,000.00 to CC-2 from California to Marysville, Washington;
27 nn. On or about September 23, 2013, CC-1 wired a bribe payment in the
28 amount of \$8,000.00 to CC-3 from California to Des Moines, Washington;

1 oo. On or about September 27, 2013, CC-4 installed malware on
2 AT&T's internal protected network;
3 pp. On or about September 30, 2013, CC-1 wired \$68,000.00 to Endless
4 Trading FZE, in Dubai, UAE;
5 qq. On or about October 18, 2013, CC-5 opened a Google account with
6 the email address marvlewis691@gmail.com;
7 rr. On or about October 22, 2013, MUHAMMAD FAHD sent CC-5
8 instructions on how to operate malware on AT&T's internal protected network;
9 ss. On or about October 26, 2013, MUHAMMAD FAHD opened a
10 Google account with the email address fahdibrahim85@gmail.com;
11 tt. On or about November 5, 2014, MUHAMMAD FAHD and CC-1
12 discussed accessing AT&T's internal protected network;
13 uu. On or about November 6, 2014, CC-2 opened a Google account with
14 the email address paidinfullkid@gmail.com;
15 vv. On or about November 6, 2014, MUHAMMAD FAHD provided
16 CC-1 with stolen network credentials for AT&T's internal protected network;
17 ww. On or about November 18, 2014, MUHAMMAD FAHD discussed
18 programming routers to provide access to AT&T's internal protected network;
19 xx. On or about November 25, 2014, MUHAMMAD FAHD sent a
20 router to CC-2 via FedEx from Dubai, UAE to Lynnwood, Washington;
21 yy. In or around November 2014, CC-2 provided a router configured to
22 provide unauthorized access to AT&T's internal protected network to CC-5;
23 zz. On or about January 26, 2015, CC-1 wired \$30,000 to Endless
24 Trading FZE in Dubai, UAE;
25 aaa. On or about November 20, 2014, CC-6 wired \$100,000.00 to
26 Endless Trading FZE in Dubai, UAE;
27 bbb. On or about March 27, 2015, CC-1 wired \$30,000.00 to Endless
28 Trading FZE in Dubai, UAE;

ccc. On or about August 9, 2015, MUHAMMAD FAHD traveled to Dubai, United Arab Emirates, from Karachi, Pakistan;

ddd. On or about August 10, 2015, CC-2 traveled from Seattle, Washington to Dubai, UAE to pick up a bribe payment and meet with MUHAMMAD FAHD;

eee. On or about August 26, 2015, CC-1 wired \$25,000.00 to Endless Trading FZE in Dubai, UAE;

fff. On or about December 5, 2015, AN traveled from Seattle, Washington to Houston, Texas to pick up a bribe for CC-5;

ggg. On or about December 16, 2016, MUHAMMAD FAHD opened a Google account with the email address fahd.patel85@gmail.com;

All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.

COUNT 3

(Accessing a Protected Computer in Furtherance of Fraud)

1. The Grand Jury realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in Counts 1 and 2 of this Indictment and further charges that:

2. Beginning at a date uncertain, but no later than in or around April 2013, and continuing until in or around October 2013, at Bothell, within the Western District of Washington and elsewhere, MUHAMMAD FAHD, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, knowingly and with intent to defraud accessed protected computers without authorization and exceeded authorized access and by means of such conduct furthered the intended fraud and obtained something of value, specifically, the defendant and others downloaded and installed malware onto AT&T's protected computers and executed the malware programs designed to facilitate fraudulent and unauthorized

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1 unlocking transactions on AT&T's wireless network and by means of such conduct
2 furthered the intended fraud and obtained things of value exceeding \$5,000.00 in any 1-
3 year period.

4 All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1030(a)(4) and (c)(3)(A)
5 and 2.

6 **COUNT 4**

7 **(Intentional Damage to a Protected Computer)**

8 1. The Grand Jury realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in
9 Counts 1 and 2 of this Indictment and further charges that:

10 2. Beginning at a date uncertain, but no later than in or around April 2013, and
11 continuing until in or around October 2013, at Bothell, within the Western District of
12 Washington and elsewhere, MUHAMMAD FAHD, and others known and unknown to
13 the Grand Jury, knowingly caused the transmission of a program, information, code, and
14 command, specifically malicious code that was downloaded and installed on AT&T's
15 protected computers without AT&T's knowledge or consent, and as a result of such
16 conduct, intentionally caused damage without authorization to protected computers,
17 which damage caused losses to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period of at least
18 \$5,000.00 and affected 10 or more protected computers during a 1 year period.

19 All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1030(a)(5)(A) and
20 (c)(4)(B)(i) and 2.

21 **COUNT 5**

22 **(Accessing a Protected Computer in Furtherance of Fraud)**

23 1. The Grand Jury realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in
24 Counts 1 and 2 of this Indictment and further charges that:

25 2. Beginning at a date uncertain, but no later than in or around November
26 2014, and continuing until in or around September 2017, at Bothell, within the Western
27 District of Washington and elsewhere, MUHAMMAD FAHD, and others known and
28 unknown to the Grand Jury, knowingly and with intent to defraud accessed protected

1 computers without authorization and exceeded authorized access and by means of such
2 conduct furthered the intended fraud and obtained something of value, specifically, the
3 defendant and others downloaded and installed malware onto AT&T's protected
4 computers and executed the malware programs designed to facilitate fraudulent and
5 unauthorized unlocking transactions on AT&T's wireless network and by means of such
6 conduct furthered the intended fraud and obtained things of value exceeding \$5,000.00 in
7 any 1-year period.

8 All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1030(a)(4) and (c)(3)(A)
9 and 2.

10 **COUNT 6**

11 **(Intentional Damage to a Protected Computer)**

12 1. The Grand Jury realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in
13 Counts 1 and 2 of this Indictment and further charges that:

14 2. Beginning at a date uncertain, but no later than in or around November
15 2014, and continuing until in or around September 2017, at Bothell, within the Western
16 District of Washington and elsewhere, MUHAMMAD FAHD, and others known and
17 unknown to the Grand Jury, knowingly caused the transmission of a program,
18 information, code, and command, specifically malicious code that was downloaded and
19 installed on AT&T's protected computers without AT&T's knowledge or consent, and as
20 a result of such conduct, intentionally caused damage without authorization to protected
21 computers, which damage caused losses to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period of
22 at least \$5,000.00 and affected 10 or more protected computers during a 1 year period.

23 All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1030(a)(5)(A) and
24 (c)(4)(B)(i) and 2.

25 **FORFEITURE ALLEGATIONS**

26 12. The allegations contained in Counts 1 through 6 of this Indictment are
27 hereby realleged and incorporated by reference for the purpose of alleging forfeitures
28 pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(C), Title 28, United States

1 Code, Section 2461(c), Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(a)(2)(B), and Title 18,
2 United States Code, Section 1030(i) .

3 13. Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(C) and Title 28,
4 United States Code, Section 2461(c), upon conviction of the offense in violation of Title
5 18, United States Code, Section 1349, as set forth in Count 1, the defendant shall forfeit
6 to the United States of America, any property, real or personal, which constitutes or is
7 derived from proceeds traceable to the charged offense. The property to be forfeited
8 includes, but is not limited to, a sum of money representing the amount of proceeds the
9 defendant obtained as a result of the charged offense.

10 14. Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(C) and Title 28,
11 United States Code, Section 2461(c), upon conviction of a conspiracy to violate Title 18,
12 United States Code, Sections 1030(a)(4) and (c)(3)(A) and Title 18, United States Code,
13 Sections 1030(a)(5)(A) and (c)(4)(B)(i), in violation of Title 18, United States Code,
14 Section 371, as set forth in Count 2, the defendant shall forfeit to the United States of
15 America any property, real or personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds
16 traceable to the charged offense. The property to be forfeited includes, but is not limited
17 to, the following: a sum of money representing the amount of proceeds the defendant
18 obtained as a result of the charged offense.

19 15. Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(a)(2)(B), and Title
20 18, United States Code, Section 1030(i) , upon conviction of a violation of Title 18,
21 United States Code, Sections 1030(a)(4) and (c)(3)(A), as set forth in Counts 3 and 5, the
22 defendant shall forfeit to the United States of America any property, real or personal,
23 which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to the charged offense. The
24 property to be forfeited includes, but is not limited to, the following: a sum of money
25 representing the amount of proceeds the defendant obtained as a result of the charged
26 offense.

27 16. Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(a)(2)(B), and Title
28 18, United States Code, Section 1030(i) , upon conviction of a violation of Title 18,

1 United States Code, Sections 1030(a)(5)(A) and (c)(4)(B)(i), as set forth in Counts 4 and
2 6, the defendant shall forfeit to the United States of America any property, real or
3 personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to the charged offense.
4 The property to be forfeited includes, but is not limited to, the following: a sum of money
5 representing the amount of proceeds the defendant obtained as a result of the charged
6 offense.

7 17. If any of the property described above, as a result of any act or omission
8 of the defendants:

- 9 a. cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;
- 10 b. has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party;
- 11 c. has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court;
- 12 d. has been substantially diminished in value; or
- 13 e. has been commingled with other property which cannot be divided
14 without difficulty,

15 ///

16 ///

17 ///


1 the United States of America shall be entitled to forfeiture of substitute property pursuant
2 to Title 21, United States Code, Section 853(p), as incorporated by Title 28, United States
3 Code, Section 2461(c).


4
5 A TRUE BILL:


6
7 DATED: 11.15.17

8
9
10 (Signature of Foreperson redacted pursuant
11 to policy of the Judicial Conference)
12 FOREPERSON

13 
14 ANNETTE L. HAYES
15 United States Attorney

16 
17 ANDREW C. FRIEDMAN
18 Assistant United States Attorney

19 
20 NORMAN BARBOSA
21 Assistant United States Attorney

22 
23 ANDREW PAK
24 Trial Attorney
25 Computer Crimes and Intellectual Property Section